Dianne Feinstein asks feds for waiver for Metrolink -- now, not later

The crash on Thursday between a Metrolink train and Burlington Northern-Santa Fe Railway train in Rialto caught the attention of California Sen. Dianne Feinstein. She has asked the Federal Railroad Administration to speed up granting waivers to Metrolink that would allow the commuter rail line to install automatic train stop devices to stop its trains before collisions occur. Feinstein suggests that the FRA is standing in the way.

I've posted the Feinstein press release and letter to the FRA after the jump.

--Steve Hymon

Feinstein's press release followed by her letter to the FRA:

Washington, DC – In the wake of last Friday’s rail collision in Rialto, California, between a Metrolink commuter train and a Burlington Northern Sante Fe (BNSF) freight train, U.S. Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) urged the Federal Railway Administration (FRA) to expedite implementation of collision avoidance systems.

In particular, Senator Feinstein called on the federal agency to provide Metrolink with the necessary waivers it requested on November 18 to install collision avoidance systems. Currently, Metrolink is prohibited from installing any anti-collision system unless all trains on a route use the same technology. Anti-collision systems could prevent crashes in which trains fail to stop at red light signals -- which the National Transportation Safety Board believes occurred in both the Rialto collision last Friday and the deadly Chatsworth crash on September 12.

“Federal Railroad Administration regulations should protect the safety of railroad passengers, but today they stand in the way of this safety system,” Senator Feinstein wrote in a letter to FRA Administrator Joseph Boardman. “In the wake of recent Metrolink accidents, I request that FRA grant an immediate, emergency waiver to the Metrolink system so that it is able to deploy safety systems unilaterally.  In this extraordinary circumstance, I do not believe Metrolink should be required to obtain the approval of freight railroads and Amtrak before moving forward.”   

A newly enacted federal rail safety law included a key safety provision, strongly advocated by Senators Feinstein and Barbara Boxer (D-Calif.), mandating the implementation of collision-avoidance systems on America’s major passenger, commuter and freight lines by 2015.

Following is the text of a letter sent by Senator Feinstein to FRA Administrator Boardman:

Mr. Joseph H. Boardman

Administrator

Federal Railroad Administration

1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE

Washington, DC 20590

Dear Mr. Boardman:

I am writing to request that the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) work as expeditiously as possible to provide Metrolink with the necessary waivers it requested on November 18 to install collision avoidance systems.  As you know, multiple collision avoidance systems available today would have prevented the recent Metrolink crash from occurring.  Unfortunately, FRA regulations stand in the way of Metrolink deploying these systems, and I am concerned that these regulations will delay the systems from being installed at the earliest possible date.

FRA regulation prevents Metrolink from operating collision avoidance systems unless all trains on a route use the same technology.  This regulation prevents Metrolink from utilizing train stopping technologies that are designed specifically for passenger rail instead of freight.  The regulation also prevents Metrolink from deploying safety technologies on its routes unilaterally, and would force Metrolink to foot the bill for equipping freight rail engines with safety technology in some cases.

Metrolink has requested permission to deploy the Automatic Train Stop (ATS) system, an older collision avoidance system currently operating in San Diego.  ATS is already installed, but not operating, on Metrolink trains.  Had ATS been operating on the Metrolink train in Chatsworth, the Metrolink engineer would have heard an alarm when he failed to stop at the red signal.  Had the engineer failed to respond to the alarm, Metrolink technicians believe that the system would have applied emergency brakes to the Metrolink train before the fatal crash occurred.   

Federal Railroad Administration regulations should protect the safety of railroad passengers, but today they stand in the way of this safety system.  In the wake of recent Metrolink accidents, I request that FRA grant an immediate, emergency waiver to the Metrolink system so that it is able to deploy safety systems unilaterally.  In this extraordinary circumstance, I do not believe Metrolink should be required to obtain the approval of freight railroads and Amtrak before moving forward.   

I also request that FRA convene an emergency meeting of all freight and passenger rail service providers operating in Los Angeles County in order to develop a plan for deploying comprehensive collision avoidance systems on all railroads in this region by 2012.

As you may know, I am a firm believer in the future of rail.  I understand that rail moves both people and goods in a more environmentally friendly and more cost-effective manner than most other modes of transportation.  But the future of rail rests on the safety of rail systems.  The Federal Railroad Administration has an obligation to step forward and restore the public’s trust.  I look forward to working with you in this effort.

                                      Sincerely,

                                      Dianne Feinstein

                                      United States Senator

Comments

[Alan Kandel]

In light of this most recent incident and others, I would strongly advise readers to visit the Economist Web site and read: "Blind man at the brake: A little automation could save lives," for added perspective. Or for a greater understanding on railroad signaling and collision avoidance technologies, please refer to the Association of American Railroads' "Railroad Industry Perspective: NTSB (National Transportation Safety Board) PTC (Positive Train Control) Symposium, March 2, 2005," by Robert C. VanderClute, available as a pdf.

I would like to add the following.

Between August 30, 1996 and November 26, 2008 there have been no less than seven train on train collisions in California. The one in '96 occurred in Beaumont with a Southern Pacific freight train rear-ending another at about 20 mph, California Public Utilities Commission documents show. According to the CPUC, two more occurred in 1999. The first in March resulted in one Coaster commuter train clipping the rear car of a second Coaster train near the town of Del Mar. The next one, in July, involved two Union Pacific freight trains colliding head-on near Palm Springs. Since 2000, there was the BNSF/Metrolink collision in Placentia in year 2002, a BNSF/BNSF head-on at Kismet near Madera in the San Joaquin Valley on June 14, 2006 and then, of course, the widely publicized Metrolink/UP head-on in Chatsworth on Sept. 12tth and the Metrolink/BNSF mishap just this past Nov. 20th. Common to all these crashes is that at least one of the trains involved in these collisions failed to stop in time before passing critical control signals displaying red "stop" lights, this is according to official documentation in the first five, and according to preliminary reports in the last two.

Assuming there are going to be repeats, what can be done in the shortest period of time that will effect the greatest amount of good? The answer could be as simple as installing software on onboard locomotive computer hardware on those locomotives already outfitted with what's called "cab signaling" (refer to the VanderClute pdf mentioned above on page 13 for a illustrated description) to monitor these locomotive cab-installed signals. In the event a locomotive engineer does not respond appropriately or at all, inaction or inappropriate action - whichever the case may be - would be picked up by the onboard computer via the proper software, and then would intervene and seize operational control of the train from the locomotive engineer and apply brakes and bring to a stop where warranted. This system is not designed to replace onboard locomotive personnel, but would be there as a backup before a train becomes otherwise errant should it fail to stop before arriving at a critcal control signal displaying a "red" stop aspect. As was brought out in Senator Dianne Feinstein's press release in the blog above, "Anti-collision systems could prevent crashes in which trains fail to stop at red light signals -- which the National Transportation Safety Board believes occurred in both the Rialto collision last Friday and the deadly Chatsworth crash on September 12."

There is a system similar to what I have described on the New Jersey Transit line. It's called ASES for Advanced Speed Enforcement System and information to this effect can be accessed by visiting the NJT Web site which can then be found in press release form dated February 13, 2002.

To allege that train collision avoidance is unttainable doesn't exactly wash. The technology is there. Think high-speed rail systems in Europe and Asia which have never experienced a single collision throughout their histories. Japan's Shinkansen bullet train system has been in service since 1964.

I'm a retired railroad signalman and I've done a considerable amount of research into this area. I don't want to hear of another collision before corrective measures are taken. The cost of doing nothing at all is simply too great.

[Robert Arkow]

Do you really expect Metrolink to tell the whole truth on this one? I don’t.

Metrolink is more concerned with its “trademark” and their new decal designs than it is concerned with passenger safety. (Priorities, LA Times, October 24, 2008)

They even went after webmasters that posted comments about Metrolink. I know, I had to defend my website against Metrolink in an international court. (If they sued in US courts, they could have been counter sued under California’s SLAPP laws (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation).

Why don’t they care about safety? Because they can “blame” safety issues on their contractor, thus leaving Metrolink, and it’s appointed board, blameless.

What would you expect from an appointed board, appointed by politicians that regularly blame everyone but themselves for the problems that they themselves create.

The apple does not fall far from the tree!

Robert Arkow
Webmaster
www.metrolinkrider.com

[jlex]

We do not want another Chatsworth in train collision. So an immediate suggestion of this sort is always welcome. We just have to hope it doesn't fell in another deaf ear.