Metrolink train never hit brakes: Story roundup, Sept. 17

Here's a quick roundup of stories on the Metrolink crash:

The NTSB says that they've ruled out mechanical, track and train problems in Friday's crash between a Metrolink commuter train and Union Pacific freight train. It also appears trackside signals were working, but the brakes on the Metrolink train were never applied. Meanwhile, Sens. Dianne Feinstein and Barbara Boxer introduce legislation to force the nation's railroads to install technology to stop trains that run red lights in high-risk areas by 2012 and all areas by 2014. The NTSB also said it is looking into media reports that Sanchez was driving a train earlier this month that struck a man in Northridge -- an incident that police have ruled a suicide.

We also have a story that takes a deeper look at Sanchez, a private man who had suffered setbacks in recent years, including the suicide of his partner. One friend indicates he may have been diabetic. A third story discusses the $200-million cap on liability that Congress imposed on individual railroads for their accidents and says that the damages from Friday's crash could top that mark if the cap is challenged or found not to apply to commuter railroads.

Over at Slate, there's a good piece looking at how some railroads certify their engineers. The gist of it is that each railroad must train and then certify their engineers under a long list of federal rules. The training program includes significant time both in the classroom and in a locomotive with an experienced engineer. 

-- Steve Hymon

Comments

[Richard]

How is this kind of thing possible when we can airplanes that don't travel on fixed tracks, through the sky onto the ground with crashing??

Don't railroads have something similar to "Air Traffic Control" center?

I'm trying to get to talk to Jerry Ringler, who's the attorney that helped get money for the last victims of Metrolink back in 2005. He's got an article, http://www.rkallp.com/metrolink-disaster-lawyers.html, on his site, but I'd like more specific information.

Do they have these kinds of accidents in other places around the country? I'm from Chicago and I don't remember anything like this happening... other than one of the "L" trains falling off the tracks above the Loop.

[Tom]

Something to consider: Two trains traveling toward one another on same track average 45 mph around a blind curve with approximately (give/take, looking at LATimes/NTSB reenactment photos) 300 total feet of visibility (length of football field), or, 66 feet per second (divided by two since they're traveling toward one another), or, 132 feet per second. Metrolink=no horn sounded, no braking. Freight=we don't currently know. So what would it matter? They're going to collide in 2.27 seconds. Blink twice. Engineer Sanchez may have glanced/looking behind him to see what (distraction) he may have hit (track switch); never even saw the freight train...no horn, no brakes...2.27 seconds.
Be interesting to check distances between two blown thru lights, track switch, impact, mph/feet per second, line of vision (homes, trees, tunnel), possible cabin procedural distractions, in seconds/feet per minute/second, combined with duties/responsibilities/judgments, trying to focus, sort, make decision, etc. Very complex algorithm. Cell texting timeline is to be considered, added into feet per second equation, warning light distances, how much time transpired (seconds), etc; maybe not enough to do much of anything except make immediate post track switch fail-safe decision (once deciding that's what it was), blink once/twice--even if Sanchez (doubtful) saw the freight train at all. Then throw in possible dead space communication (over last two lights), conductor recollection, dispatch transmissions. Lots to consider...

[vince ex signalman]

most people dont realize that a locomotive engineer and conductor / switchman whether freight or passenger, do not just show up and "go to work". by jumping on their train and throttling away down the track. there is so much paperwork, consists, hazmat and slow orders, form Ds, trackwork protection orders track occupancy permits. you must talk to dispatchers and carmen in the yard(who make sure your train has enough air in the brakes and that all your lights and systems work. then you need to talk to the yardmaster, the trainmaster,discuss the daily safety briefings, the rule of the day and the month, see where other yard crews are,etc...etc..it is a monumental task. you have to be qualified on the rails you ride on. you must know in detail before you ever get out there, every block, signal number, every switch, and every single milepost number for the territory you travel. ) example.. an engineer from riverside to l.a., line is not neccessarily qualified to run a train from simi to santa barbara. that is called( physical characteristics) I used to be required to carry volumes of rule books, timetables with updated changes every single day and trip.( it took a entire backpack to carry it all. i am not exaggerating) you had to know all different radio freq and channels. i could go on and on, oh by the way, and that is only for YOUR OWN RAILROAD. if you are lucky enough to work in a area like so. calif. where metrolink, union pacific AND amtrak operate on the same rails, it is TRIPLE the rules and paperwork and confusion. you might work with the same crew for 2 months in a row if you have enough seniority, or never see the same face twice in ten years. (as a train crew member. signal and track depts have regular days and hrs,except sig maintainers, who are on call 24/7 365 to fix crossing gates, lights etc) i briefly worked downtown as a signalman at the old los angeles tower (outside l.a. county jail) when metro link was being prepared to go in 1992. at that time there were 5 major railroads on basically the same tracks. you had santa fe, southern pacific, union pacific, amtrak and metrolink. you cannot fathom the complications, blueprints, signals switches, operators that were involved. (kudos to those older railroaders to kept it running like clockwork safely. to them it was a way of life, not just a job) there was a tower operator there i think she worked for santa fe, her name was jan, i think her last name was green. she was the most phenomenal railroader ever. she had the hardest job you could possibly imagine, pulling levers, setting up signals and switches for all incoming and outgoing trains. she was a machine, incredible job performance, i dont know how many years she had with them but she should have been the chairman of santa fe. this was all by hand throw levers in the tower,(i bet you could google "old L.a. r.r. tower" and get great pics of it) before computers and automation. i dont know how she knew what she was doing, what a monumental safety task and responsibility she had.
in a nutshell, our hearts go out to all the families of this disaster. i think it had to be engineer fault, but i could be wrong. railroad equipment is super super heavy duty stuff that is built to last for decades in severe extremes and RARELY malfunctions. so before everyone wants to Hate" the railroad, remember they were here first and built this country. give some credit to the people who run these trains safely every day and get between the couplers and wheels and dig in all kinds of detectors on the tracks and make sure that all the gates come down. i can guarantee you that you might get stuck at a crossing with the lights and gates going, and maybe no train is coming, but you will NEVER NEVER be at a crossing with a train approaching and not see the crossing activated. there are too many safety devices . but like i wrote last night on the other blog, this is why they call them accidents.
(even though idiots go around them daily, guess who gets the blame) one more thing......why did this train not shut down if he didnt hit his alerter. MOST freight locomotives (i would think ALL passenger locos) have what you call the infamous deadmans feature of some type. on the trains i worked on it was a little spring sticking out of the engineers console about 6 inches. most of them were set to go about every 30 seconds,getting louder and louder with a bright red digital readout flashing the time countdown, until it was a unbearable beeping in the cab. as long as the engineer did SOMETHING, air reduction, horn or just hit the little spring,all was ok. if he didnt, it would put the train in emergency. why has no one mentioned that yet........

[Tumbleweed]

Is it possible that Sanchez, the conductor, might have committed suicide and took 23 innocent people with him? The fact that his partner recently committed suicide might have had an impact. I read that there were a total of three stop indicators that were overlooked and to crash head on without applying the brakes indicates a certain premeditation.

[Gokhan]

The engineer never hit the brakes doesn't necessarily mean that he had a heart attack or committed suicide. On the blind curve on which the collision took place, he might have been simply looking behind from his cab, trying to figure what he just ran over that rattled his locomotive a few seconds ago, which was actually the track switch he broke.

Chances are that we may never find out if the last two signals that he never called off were working or not. Jut the postmortem NTSB tests show that they were working doesn't mean that they were working for 100% sure. A temporary electrical glitch or a mishap at the Metrolink control center might have momentraily turned them off before the collision. In any case the real culpirt is the lack of positive train-control system, which the Feds have not been able to enforce so far but only until this tragic collision.

[Vicky]

This is proven system and used in Indian Railways

[Allan S.]

I'm a sometimes rider of this particular Metrolink line. The
lead into the Santa Susana Pass tunnels is obviously
dangerous. Some kind of inexpensive system could have been installed in that high danger area, for perhaps a
few tens of thousands of dollars, that would have
allowed for, heart attacks, suicide, or seizure, of the single
train operator, entering the "single track" tunnel area.
One "pilot" should not be allowed to fly 500 potential
passengers. Shut down the line, until, something workable
is installed.

[Bigdave125]

I work for the U.S. government, and repair IFF equipment for the Navy. IFF stands for "Identification, Friend or Foe" and is it’s a black box used in airplanes to allow the tower (and other airplanes) to identify different planes and in war to identify if the are hostile or friendly. Anyway, this type of system could be used to identify the trains and GPS (Global Positioning System) info could be combined to track and if need be stop the trains that are on a collision course. It could be done without a huge system, since the technology exist and is relatively cheap. I believe the reason that it hasn't been implemented before now is because the railroads are just worried about the bottom line, i.e. greed, and that the Engineer/Conductor unions don't want anything that might make their job obsolete! Dang it, get a system in place that will prevent this! There is no excuse for this happening in this day and age and with our technology!!!

Bigdave125

[Per Sjofors]

I'm just so amazed that the US rail system are still in the stone ages. For at least the last 50-60 years, European railways have had "remote blocking" that prevents any train from running a red light. And I saw a comment from a Metrolink official that "the technology is unproven". BS! Would have saved lives and so much grief.