Metrolink crash: How trains navigate the tracks

I spoke earlier to Francisco Oaxaca, a spokesman for Metrolink. The following is an overview of the systems in place that are supposed to help trains safely travel tracks in the Southland.

A quick review: The accident happened on a stretch of single track that runs through the Santa Susana Pass. There is double track immediately to the south of the crash site near the Chatsworth station (it runs from about DeSoto Avenue to Rinaldi Street). To the west of the pass, there is about 7,600 feet of double track near Simi Valley and another 8,000 feet of double track about five miles south of the Moorpark station.

In Los Angeles County, Metrolink owns the tracks used by the Ventura County-bound trains. That means it's also up to Metrolink to maintain the tracks and signals and to dispatch its trains. The Metrolink dispatch center is located in Pomona. At the center, dispatchers look at computer screens with schematics of all the rail lines in the area on which they can electronically monitor the progress of trains -- dispatchers can also see trains on tracks owned by others, such as the Union Pacific. Electronic signals are sent to the signals along the tracks from the center.

It is up to the engineer on the Metrolink train to see the signal and abide by it. “The engineer sees the signal, and then will contact the conductor over the radio and will call out the signal he or she has observed and the location and the conductor will repeat back that they did receive the communication from the engineer,” Oaxaca said.

I asked him if Metrolink knows if such a communication occurred on Friday. “That’s going to be part of our investigation and that’s what we’re working with the NTSB on,” Oaxaca said.

The train that crashed on Friday had one engineer and one conductor, as is usual for Metrolink. The engineer was killed, according to Metrolink, but Oaxaca said that the conductor, who survived, is believed to have been in the rear car of the three-car train. “I haven’t seen any statement from the conductor yet,” Oaxaca said.

Metrolink has 20 of its trains cross the Santa Susana Pass each day. Oaxaca did not know the number of freight trains that use the tracks (Amtrak also has service on those tracks), but said the Union Pacific freight train is a regular train. “That is a daily freight train," he said. "It’s a regular traveler on those tracks…They don’t fall on a regular schedule like we do. It’s my understanding that an encounter of our train and the freight train is a fairly regular occurrence -– not necessarily in that particular location. It can be in other locations depending on how early or late that freight train is coming.”

Note to readers: Obviously, there is still a lot of information that has not been released about the crash of Metrolink Train 111. Metrolink officials said earlier that the train crash was their fault and that the engineer ignored a red signal telling him to stop.

--Steve Hymon

Comments

[Ron]

I hope this gets Metrolink to not only install safety equipment but do some serious thought into building new tracks that don't get shared with Union Pacific.

Human error and future technologies aside, its the sharing of tracks with active freight trains that's the real safety concern here. Its just something that should never happen in the first place.

[Spokker]

"While I agree that the blame game needs to not be done in lieu of commiserating with the families of lost ones"

Are you commiserating when you complain about the Metro buses running red lights?

[Spokker]

"Cutting the crew means more profits for the railroads, at the expense of safety."

What profits? Metrolink? Fares only cover half of the operating cost to run the damn train. The rest is subsidized.

Union Pacific? They would rather see the passenger trains off their lines to be honest.

[Retired RR]

It is premature to place blame right now. I won't get into signals or CTC as many others have already posted regarding that.

The simple fact is that there is no longer a Fireman on board as a safety backup. Fireman were Engineer Helpers, or if you will, Apprentice Engineers, and EVERY train was required to have one. California railraods cleverly got rid of them by claiming that Fireman were no longer needed and were featherbedding. People were stupid and did not know better and voted for a Proposition to allow railroads to run without a Fireman.

Train crews are now, for the most part made up of TWO persons, attempting to do the job of FOUR.

Perhaps the Engineer did blow the signal; perhaps he had a stroke or fainted for any number of reasons. There was no one in the cab to observe this or take action in case this did happen. Cutting the crew means more profits for the railroads, at the expense of safety.

[Bob]

Kari,

The Red Line was not in any way involved in the collision. It is a subway line part of MetroRAIL managed by the MTA. The Purple, Blue, Green and Gold lines are also a part of the MetroRAIL system. The Red Line is a subway line.

Metrolink is a Commuter Rail Line that is like an Amtrak Passenger Train, except it stops at stations that are on the average five miles apart. Metrolink goes to Lancaster, Oxnard, Riverside, San Bernardino and Oceanside. The tracks are shared with the freight railroads and Amtrak.

MetroRAIL has its own tracks used by its subway and light rail vehicles and does not share any tracks with the freight railroads, Amtrak or Metrolink.

[Train Guy]

I seem to see a lot of comments from people that do not understand rail operations. First point of fact: the signals/lights were not burned out. Second point: both the UP and Metro travel under the direction of the Metro Dispatcher, so they would both have radio contact with the dispatcher. Third point: the Dispatcher is looking at a lighted board showing switch indicator lights for each sidng and each signal. Fourth point: where the Metro got through the north switch of the siding it was supposed to stop in, the indicator light would have shown the switch lined for straight or main line rail even after the Metro ran through the switch, so the Dispatcher would not have known the Metro did not stop as the UP train was now into the same signal block, which also lights up on the Dispatchers board. Yes there are daily mechanical, equipment, and human errors in the rail industry as there are with any type of transportation. You can speculate all you want, but know the real facts before you go off on a mass cover up plot or increased rail safety rant. Rail transportation, both passenger and freight, are still the safest modes of transportation. Remember that the next time you start up your automobile

[Kymberleigh Richards]

I find it unfortunate, given the loss of life, that there is so much "armchair quarterbacking" going on.

Why can't everyone just wait for the NTSB to complete its investigation and report?

At the very least, posting your own opinions is of little comfort to the friends and families of those who died in this crash.

[Kari Jones]

Was the red line invvoled in this crash ?

[Deven]

As the story unfolds, more comes to light about the engineer texting a friend. With modern technology at work, it will become apparent that the engineer's attention was taken away from his post by his use of text messaging. It sickens me to think that 25 people have lost their lives due to such irresponsibility. THe friend who was answering the engineer's texts should be ashamed of himself for continuing to text the engineer, all the while knowing that the engineer was at work and driving a train of passengers. What is the world coming to when responsiblity and common sense is so absent from reality? I hope that the citizens of Los Angeles will get outraged over this horrible display of negligence of post. Traffic accidents have dropped dramatically due to the enforced use of bluetooths while driving...and though it sucks to have to constantly seek legislation on such common-sense issues as "don't email friends while driving a train" it seems like the greater American public in fact needs such legislation to hold their hand while they go through life.

[Randall BusTard]

While I agree that the blame game needs to not be done in lieu of commiserating with the families of lost ones—and I send out heartfelt condolences to all who are suffering; I use public transit every day—I have to state that all facets of mass public transit in Los Angeles needs to be looked at closely. Metro busses run red lights every day in downtown, through busy intersections during rush hour. I have loads of footage of the busses running lights already red, and it is only a matter of time before a similar incident occurs.
The lack of oversight appears to be de facto policy among the mass transit agencies in L.A.

[gj]

You can land the space shuttle by computer alone, based on 40 year-old technology.
.
The cpu in your home computer process millions of gate-keeping and switching functions a minute, flawlessly.

Yet we rely on a bunch of error-prone human operators to protect us. It's senseless.

The real issues here are a complete lack of imagination on the part of planners, the insistence on meeting the demands for jobs for engineers etc on the part of unions despite their obsolesence, and the lack of willingness on the part of railroads to pay for necessary safety improvements. But they'll pay in the courts after this fiasco. Not sure what those union reps and company spokesflacks can say to the families of the dozens of dead and injured, however, other than "I got mine".

[pdc]

A technological solution, Positive Train Control, to prevent these catastrophes has been available for years and actively recommended by the NTSB for at least 10 years. The rail industry has resisted adoption of this technology because of the expense and a state of mind that "things are safe enough". Hopefully, this disaster will prompt some clearer thinking about the balance of public safety versus corporate inertia. If Metrolink is to maintain any sort of public credibility, they need to get out in front of this issue now.

[Caroline]

I thank all the train enthusiasts who have responded with more info on how train signaling works, especially Old Coot.

What I am wondering now is why isn't the Times and the other local news people getting this background information out there to the public. After all, if we don't really know how the system works then how can Metrolink officials blame someone so early?

Isn't this sort of like saying that my car wouldn't start today because I didn't know where to insert the key, and then you open the hood and find out my battery has been stolen? Everyone is jumping to a lot of conclusions.

The engineer was texting---that's crazy---but is there a rule against texting in the Metrolink employee manuals? Did he miss all the stop signals or did the signals even work that day?

And always keep in mind that the #1 issue in the city's mind is to avoid being sued. If it was their signals that failed do you think they will admit to that? Not in a million years.

[Jenny Paris]

Hello, I am writing from France, and I would like to make a comment on the single track entrance protection.

Using Google map, it is easy to visualize the track layout before the curved single track, and it is amazing that a single red light, ending the 2 tracks section, conditions the entrance on the single track portion, heading towards the curved section (zooming on the 2 tracks, merging).

As used in France railways, when a track is protected by a red light (Absolute stop - a "Square"), often the merging track is also diverted on a parallel track, avoiding the faulty train, not stopping on red, to enter the main track. This parallel track can be half a mile, or something.

This is not high tech technology, like the GPS security system discussed in USA, but it is better to end its path on trackless ground using this kind of technique.

Having been living in SC close to the Santa Fe line, and have always been amazed seeing a single track line, shared by passengers and goods, without these diverting devices.

J.

[Jay]

I,also, remain skeptical. I cannot remember a train incident in my 37 years of RR'ing that an authority has ponied up so quickly to take the blame. Maybe the fact that the engineer was employed by an outside "contractor" has something to do with it. Sounds like LA lawyer damage control to me. May everyone who perished rest in peace.

[J in Pasadena]

It's real easy to toss blame on the dead guy and make this whole fiasco out to be one man's negligence. The transportation agency is in a bind now, and they are trying to cover their arses. It's a lot easier to explain to a jury that this accident was caused by a reckless, rogue employee than to own up to endemic safety and transportation failures. It's probably cheaper too (in terms of reduced punitive damages). I don't know that the texting had anything to do with this whatsoever. There are too many variables. But I do want to know why this system continued to operate on a single track for so long with zero plans for upgrade. Hell, I want to know who decided to put it into service in the first place. I believe the transportation agency will stop at nothing to cover its inefficiencies and failures. Someone here should be charged with a felony for violating public trust, and it's not the dead train driver.

[Justin W.]

Much of what has been said about this incident doesn't seem to add up. Metrolink has said that it was their engineer's fault and that he ran the red signal at CP Topanga.

Red signals don't appear randomly in front of trains. A red signal (i.e. a "Stop" indication) must be preceded by a signal indicating an "Approach" indication, (i.e. a yellow signal). A Yellow signal is in turn preceded by an "Advanced Approach" signal (i.e. a flashing yellow signal).

For this event to have been caused by operator error, the engineer would have to not have noticed the flashing yellow signal, the yellow signal, or the red signal, an incredibly unlikely situation.

Furthermore, as the Metrolink train started from a complete stop at the Chatsworth station, the engineer had a 4000 ft straight-stretch to view a red signal at CP Topanga. At the train's slow starting speeds, this distance would have taken at least 60-70 seconds. At some point during that long period of time, the engineer would have reacted to a red signal if there had been one.

I remain skeptical.

[P42DC]

Interesting that so many have so much to say without knowledge of how RR operations work. Stick to what you know and stop speculating about what may have happened.

[russell]

What about the yellow caution signal? Was this also blown? This was the cause of a prior accident. I find it difficult to believe that a single signal could protect a large section of track, given the engineering that goes into laying out the system. It is not anything arbitrary like autos on a street. Rails have a unique property of being discretely linear.

Amtrak, Union Pacific and Metrolink all could have been monitoring the progress of this train. How is it no alarms went off?

Finally, don't these trains have automatic brakes?

[Steve]

The safety mechanisms for our rail network are clearly in a shambles. They ought to be strict enough to make this kind of accident physically impossible. It is a disgrace that human error could be allowed to create this kind of accident on a rail network.

[Lew Parker]

KCAL News stated that the train's engineer was sending a series of text messages to a group of train enthusiasts. The last documented message sent by the engineer was at 4:22 PM, one minute prior to the collision with the freight train. This may be a case of "driving while distracted."

[AlanB]

Art,

Radio interoperability would have nothing to do with this accident. The UP freight train cannot operate on Metrolink tracks unless the freight trains radio can transmit and receive on the Metrolink frequency. Additionally, once the UP freight train left UP owned tracks, it was no longer operating under the control of a UP dispatcher. It was now operating under the Metrolink dispatcher's control.

If, and that's a big if, the Metrolink dispatcher had realized that the Metrolink engineer had run the red signal, then the Metrolink dispatcher could have immediately ordered both the freight train and the Metrolink train to stop immediately by radio.

No contact with a UP dispatcher would be required.

[skumar]

My heartfelt condolences and prayers to the families who lost their loved ones in this tragedy. My prayers go out for the injured for their speedy recovery. Being a regular metrolink rider on this same line (LA Union to Chatsworth), for the past five years (sept 15th, to be precise), we always felt the family togetherness when we traveled. There were regular birthday celebrations, and always looked out for our regulars. If we don't see them on the train, we'd contact them to check if they are doing ok. It is so sad to lose our loved ones in this tragic accident. I heard conductor Bob was in the last car, and survived. My prayers for him and all the injured passengers and their families and loved ones. God Bless.

[stu ki]

What a horrible event. However, its time to do something about about California Rail. We need true passenger rail in this state. Think about it- sharing rail lines with freight is dangerous (like LA to SF or SF to SAC) Amtrak and MetroLink must take priority over freight. Freight can wait. Especially during commute hours. Doing this would increase safety and make a huge increase value for taxpayers.

LA to SF RAIL NOW! Here is the email of your official that can make it happen let him know you want no excuses. Let Bill know:

bill.bronte@dot.ca.gov

[Art Vandelay]

This terrible tragidy will probably pan out to be a radio / notification interoperability issue.
This was one of the most critical problems during the World Trade Center disaster where different agencies such as NYPD, FDNY, Port Authority, USCG, were unable to communicate with each other at that incident. Since then radio plans and new equipment have been put in place to allow interoperability between these different agencies.
It is likely that the Metro Link Dispatcher, which operates on a separate and dedicated radio frequency, was unable to communicate with the freight company dispatcher, which operates on its own proprierery radio frequency. Typically, emergency traffic in a situation such as this must take place over the telephone between dispatchers of each agency and then relayed to the field unit. This of course may take many minutes to execute; where timing is critical, this method unfortunately may result in grave delays conversely where the need to communicate in real time is absolutely necessary.