Metrolink: A system forged from freight lines

Last night, I was able to reach Richard Stanger. He was executive director of Metrolink in its infant years from 1991 to 1998 and now works as a transportation consultant. We spoke about the railroad's history and how it came to be that commuter trains and freight trains must often share the same set of tracks.

The Metrolink tracks probably carry "more freight traffic and commuter traffic than just about anywhere else in the country," Stanger said. "It's all very highly regulated and signalized and very carefully watched by dispatchers daily. There have been hundreds of thousands of freight and Metrolink trips in the last 16 years, so it's extraordinary when there's an event like this. At this point, it's too early to know the reasons behind the crash."

Stanger ran me through the history of rail in Southern California. In short, the old railroads that once offered passenger service in the region stopped in the years after World War II. Carrying freight was their meal ticket, and commuter service -- where it existed -- was mostly a money drain that got in the way.

By the late 1980s, the freight railroads weren't in particularly great financial shape and had more track than they could use. The various railroads -- Southern Pacific, Santa Fe and Union Pacific mostly -- began either selling their tracks to local transit agencies or making deals to allow commuter rail to share the tracks.

"Between 1989 and 1994, there was a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity for the MTA and the other county transportation commissions in Southern California to purchase all these right of ways," Stanger said. "From all these acquisitions we began to see if you put this together with that, you can construct a regionwide commuter rail system."

"It allowed us to put together the Metrolink system," he added. "Because L.A. is such an important freight destination, these freight carriers required that they be allowed to operate their freight trains in a subservient role continuing on. It's something that had to be done in order to get Metrolink up and running -- you had to allow the freights."

The big worry when commuter rail service started in October 1992 was about train-vehicle collisions at at-grade rail crossings.

"Especially on that line" -- the Ventura line -- "and as you go through the Valley, Glendale and toward downtown, there were a lot of street crossings -- more than we wanted," Stanger said. "For the first 10 years our emphasis was to close street crossings or maybe improve one that would allow us to close another one. That was the thrust of it. As part of the renovation of the track for commuter trains we upgraded the signal system, but there were all these street crossings that we had to focus on initially."

Friday's crash occurred on a stretch of single track that extends from just north of the Chatsworth Station through the Santa Susana Pass. There is double track again just west of the pass on the edge of Simi Valley. Was the single track through the pass a big problem through the years? I asked him.

Stanger said it had not been. The two tunnels that carry the single track under the pass were constructed in the early 1900s; building a new tunnel would be costly. Also, he said, though there is some freight moved on the Ventura line, it's not nearly as much as on the tracks east of Los Angeles -- those are the lines that deliver goods to the rest of the country.

"It would be ideal if it was double-tracked. Nevertheless, the signal system is designed to keep trains from being on the same track at the same time," Stanger said, "and it has done that year after year."

Metrolink began service Oct. 26, 1992, when a train rolled out of the Moorpark station at 5:06 a.m. and lumbered toward Los Angeles through the pass and on to Chatsworth. The first accident occurred Nov. 25 of that year, when a train hit a city street maintenance truck at an ungated crossing in Pacoima, killing the driver and leaving a dozen passengers on the train with slight injuries.

-- Steve Hymon

Photo: Spencer Weiner / Los Angeles Times

Comments

[Robert Baldwin]

"In a state where not wearing your seat belt in the car is a ticket-able offense it is appalling that so many had to die and get injured when seat belts could have helped so many people on that train. "

Look at the wreckage again. The first passenger car envelopes the Metrolink engine. Being belted in just means your body would be upright until you and the locomotive tried to occupy the same space. Seat belts are a great idea where they work, but are not very helpful in this case.

There are many improvements that could be made to make train accidents more survivable; the problem is that rail transit is already so expensive there's nothing left for even small measures. Maybe its time for some first steps.

[Ed C.]

Considering that the engineer is at fault and he's dead, I do not know who to blame. The signals told him to stop and he did not stop. Will there be a lawsuit? Even if there was I doubt it will get far. I take Metrolink every day, I anticipate no problems, it has been that way for 6 years. Compared to riding a motorcycle, bicycle, or driving a car, it's safer to be on the train. Period.

[RonG]

In the 1950s the Long Island Rail Road (New York) had a number of catastrophic collisions which led to upgraded and near fail-safe block signal systems. It is inconceivable that with more than a century of railroading lessons and technologies developed that likely points of disaster, such as the single track of this accident, are left vulnerable to simple human error. All the more so given the high-volume of passenger and freight traffic involved. This was one was waiting to happen...how many others are there in the Metrolink?

[Chris Willig]

Question: Why was a freight train carrying bulk cargo on this line in rush hour? In the Bay area CalTrain allows this only after hours. I am truly frightened by the lack of critical thinking on the part of Metro Link and UP.

Observation: Had the accident happened in the tunnel they would have lost most of the passengers. Thankfully it occurred 100 yards to the east.

[J in Pasadena]

"Building a new (separate commuter) tunnel would be costly." Indeed. The value MTA places on safety and its resultant protection of human life speaks volumes about the organization.

Someone asked in a previous blog about the relationship between MTA and Metrolink. They are like incestual cousins, except that MTA is the regional transportion planner/builder and Metrolink receives much of its funding from MTA. So I believe rightly that MTA is responsible for this fiasco.

If you are wondering how Metrolink pays homage to its cousin in terms of fiscal responsibility, take a look at this link about their recent, costly and unwise decision to spend operating funds to silence blogger critics: http://www.laweekly.com/2008-05-22/news/metrolink-tries-to-censor-bloggers/

Now, how many million$ will be spent paying off lawsuits resulting from MTA/Metrolink's callous irresponsibility in this accident. Think about how that money could have been spent more wisely on basic, common-sense safety measures that MTA routinely ignores. This whole accident just ties into all the other crummy plans past and present, including today's plans to put the Expo Line at-grade near schools.

[SCC Metrolink rider]

I usually ride this train line later in the day from Glendale to Simi and find it really unbelievable that this could happen.
Many times the train slows to a stop (or just slows way down) after the Chatsworth station to wait at the signal where the tracks merge just before where this all happened.
In a state where not wearing your seat belt in the car is a ticket-able offense it is appalling that so many had to die and get injured when seat belts could have helped so many people on that train. It wouldn't have saved them all, but it sure would have saved many from needless suffering.
These passenger trains should be under the same scrutiny as our passenger cars are as far as crash standards are concerned. How many more have to die before these simple everyday car practices are applied to trains?
This sucks I have to take this train route again starting Monday morning. Sorry to those who lost their lives and those who were injured, this never should have happened.

[NoRider]

This is but the latest in a long series of fatal accidents involving Metrolink. Metrolink isn't safe, period. I drive and stay alive.

[tony kollar]

This is a terrible accident, God Bless everyone who was on this train.

To the TSB.
I know it would be costly but wouldn't it be better if passenger trains ran on a 1 track system (monorail) and Frieght ran on the conventional 2 track system?
Passenger train tracks and frieght train tracks one can't work on the other.

I can help with simple electronic safety improvements for the existing lines. I know they share tracks currently so this is needed ASAP. I am currently working in the Telecommunications industry for over 20 years, I have ideal skills in diaster recovery why not take a chance and see what I have to offer? The problem is getting people and management to agree on simple effective systems of alerting, communication and most of all , emergency braking.
I think we have the technology and this could have been avoided. I'm sorry that's how I feel.

[jon]

What doesn't make sense is why the Metrolink train was not held at Chatsworth Station, less than a minute south of where the accident happened. The eastbound Union Pacific freight train had to have been running on the single-track line through the Santa Susanna Pass for some 15 minutes--well before the Metrolink train arrived at Chatworth--slowly climbing from Simi Valley into the rail tunnels and then slowly coming down the grade into Chatsworth from the eastern tunnel's portal, where a passing track exists just north of Chatsworth Station. It's inconceivable that the Metrolink dispatcher, who controls the line's traffic from Moorpark to Union Station, would not have communicated the information to the commuter train. In addition, the line is under a CTC (Centralized Traffic Control) signaling system, whose lights are monitored by the dispatcher. Tragically, omeone screwed up in a major way.