Boxer's opening statement from today's hearing

Here is Sen. Barbara Boxer's opening statement from today's U.S. Senate Commerce Committee briefing on the Metrolink crash:

STATEMENT OF U.S. SENATOR BARBARA BOXER
COMMERCE COMMITTEE BRIEFING ON RAIL SAFETY
SEPTEMBER 23, 2008

I want to thank Chairman Inouye, Senator Lautenberg and the Senate Commerce Committee for giving me the opportunity to host this important briefing today.

On Friday, September 12, 2008, a Metrolink commuter rail train carrying 225 passengers returning home to Simi Valley during rush hour collided head on with a Union Pacific freight train in Chatsworth, California.

Tragically, 25 people lost their lives in that terrible crash and another 135 suffered injuries. Forty of those injuries are critical and many sustained injuries that may require lifetime care.

My thoughts and prayers are with the victims and their families at this time.

I also want to thank the first responders and community leaders for all of their heroic efforts during this tragedy.

In the wake of this tragedy, it is important we examine—as best we can at this time—the factors and events that led up to this collision, so that we can take steps to ensure that something like this never happens again.

Last Tuesday, I joined Senator Feinstein in introducing legislation that would require positive train control systems to be implemented by 2014 nationwide, and in areas of high risk by 2012.

Positive Train Control is a crucial tool in the ongoing efforts to prevent head on train collisions.

In fact, the National Transportation Safety Board has been calling for the implementation of positive train control systems since the inception of its Most Wanted Transportation Safety Improvements list in 1990. In its most recent list, the NTSB states, “The board believes…... positive train control is particularly important in places where passenger trains and freight trains both operate.”

This safety issue was further highlighted when a freight train and a commuter train collided head-on in Placentia, California, in 2002, which led to the deaths of two people.

In September 1999, the Federal Railroad Administration’s Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC) reported that: Positive Train Control could prevent approximately 40 to 60 accidents, about 7 fatalities and 55 injuries each year.

The Positive Train Control system works by combining digital communications with Global Positioning System technology to monitor train locations and speeds.

These systems can detect: excessive speed; improperly aligned switches; whether trains are on the wrong track; unauthorized train movements; and whether trains have missed signals to slow or stop.  If engineers do not comply with signals, the system automatically puts on the brakes.

Both the House and Senate have passed comprehensive rail safety legislation this session that includes provisions to implement positive train control systems.  However, I strongly believe as negotiations move forward, it is imperative that we move to speed up the timelines for implementation and ensure that these systems are in place for high risk areas by 2012 and other areas by 2014.   

Senator Feinstein and I feel a great sense of urgency and are working to get legislation passed this Congress.

I also believe we need to examine other issues related to this tragedy, including the cap on damages for victims of rail accidents, the impact of worker fatigue, the use of personal communication devices when operating trains, the training and certification requirements for employees of both freight and commuter rail, and whether Federal grants are appropriate and warranted.

As gas prices continue to rise and more and more families turn to public transit, we must take additional steps to ensure the safety of our commuters.

I look forward to continuing to work with my colleagues on the Senate Commerce Committee to improve rail safety for both commuter and freight rail. 

Today, it is my hope that we will be able to shed some light on this accident and come away with some clear, consensus ideas for improving safety as we move forward. 

I am pleased that we are joined today by:

The Honorable Kitty Higgins, Board Member, National Transportation Safety Board;

The Honorable Joseph H. Boardman, Administrator, Federal Railroad Administration;

Ron Roberts, Chairman of the Board, Metrolink;

Dennis Duffy, Executive Vice President of Operations, Union Pacific;

Thank you all for appearing on such short notice.  I look forward to hearing from you all today.

Comments

[Ron Lindsey]

I was the architect for the first overlay PTC system in the country, Communication Based Train Management (CBTM) for CSX, which is the predecessor to ETMS that is being pursued by several other Class I railroads. The term Overlay means that the use of PTC does not affect the method of operation, i.e., the train crew continues to do what they do in the same manner, and PTC provides warnings and then enforcement as it deems necessary.

Mr. Jones description of how PTC works is not entirely correct. First, of all, PTC does not report the train's position and speed back to the Computer Aided Dispatching (CAD) platform that is used by the railroad's dispatching personnel. The train's position (not speed) is reported in signaled territory by OS's (on-station reports) that occur when a train enters a new block. That information is sent either wirelessly via a different RF network from PTC or via a wired codeline.

PTC does not monitor nor report locomotive diagnostics to anyone. What is being confused here is the function of PTC and the wireless infrastructure that may carry a number of different application data including PTC.

PTC, as defined by the RSAC process, has 3 core objectives:
1. keep trains from hitting trains
2. keep trains from overspeeding
3. Keep trains from violating work zones

One area that PTC does not cover is protection for workers who do not have authorities to be on the track. This situation is predominant in the NE corridor as well as with commuter railroads and transit authorities as well as freight railroads to a much lessor extent. For this reason, I have a proposal in front of the Transportation Research Board to provide a safety enhancement for this situation where "watchmen" are used to alert workers of on-coming trains.

PTC, as was initiated by CBTM, works in dark territory as well as signaled territory, which is not true of cab signaling including ACCESS on the NE corridor.

If there are additional questions regarding PTC as to how it works, or doesn't work, then you may contact me at comarch@aol.com

Lastly, there is a Railway Age Passenger Trains on Freight Railroads conference in DC on Oct 21 / 22. I will be presenting at that conference and would welcome discussing such issues with those who may be attending. My presentation will include comments on PTC.

[Tom West]

What about the 40,000+ people who die veery single year on US roads? That's over 100 hundred a day, or a 9/11 every single month. Over one THOUSAND people have been killed in road accidents since this rail accident. Any savings from positive train control would be wiped out from a single bad pileup on a highway.

The National Transportation Safety Board should deal with the US's apalling road safety first and foremost.

[Keith Jones]

You can see in the following that PTC takes effect after passing the end of your limits of authority, In The Chatsworth Metrolink wreck it would have stopped the Metrolink Train right on the switch. Then the UP freight would have come down there to go into the siding and ran in to them there. PTC would not have prevented the accident.
Two people on the headend is the only way

How it works - the basics

The train reports its position to the control center via the wireless data link. The control center's safety interlocking logic uses the data from all trains to issue limits of movement authority (LoMA) and speed limits to each train, being careful to keep safe separation between trains. The train's onboard computer monitors the LoMA and speed limit data against actual train location and speed to determine potential and actual unsafe conditions. If the train is approaching the end of its LoMA or it is nearing its speed limit, the onboard computer warns the engineer, who is expected to take appropriate action. If the train passes the end of its LoMA, the onboard computer automatically signals for a safety brake application to bring the train to a stop. Similarly, if the train exceeds its allowed speed limit, the brakes are applied to stop the train. The onboard computer also monitors various locomotive systems such as power and brakes, and automatically sends diagnostic and alarm data to the control center when appropriate.